POSITION PAPERS
SECURING THE INTERNATIONAL
SUPPLY CHAIN:
A WORK IN PROGRESS
By Peter Friedman, CONECT
Counsel
There is a tension in
Homeland Security policy - between CBP's data-driven approach, and those who
would maximize physical inspection of imported cargo. I have been concerned
that the advocates of physical inspection have been gaining some steam, as
reflected by legislation passed in the House that would require all cargo being
put on domestic passenger planes to be inspected within three years, and all
containers shipped by sea to the United States from foreign ports to be scanned
for radiation and density within three to five years.
Past Congressional hearings
have had the potential of putting the US Customs and Border Patrol Commissioner
on the griddle. Others who have testified on this topic include the General
Accountability Office (GAO) which has issued reports critical of C-TPAT, and
Stephen Flynn, who has raised security alarms in the past. These hearings have
had the potential to influence the debate on cargo security; fortunately, the
bottom line of these hearings has been far more positive than I had feared:
overall, those who testified commended and supported the CBP Commissioner while
advocating additional resources - manpower for C-TPAT verification and
non-invasive scanning equipment for CSI as well as domestic inspections.
The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has offered several recommendations to
address shortfalls in C-TPAT and CSI. While GAO has been both critical of CBP
and supportive of the progress CBP has made. In response, CBP has embraced
GAO’s recommendations, and cites corrective actions the Bureau either has taken
or plans to take to implement them.
GAO has listed many
concerns with CBP’s “trust and verify” method for the C-TPAT program,
specifically that the CBP’s certification and verification process is not
rigorous enough to ensure the security procedures outlined in members’ security
profiles are reliable, accurate, and effective. The GAO has also stated
concerns that benefits granted to members upon certification (and before
validation) are too subjective, and the CBP’s overall record keeping for the
program is incomplete and unreliable. The GAO has cited several factors that
limit CBP’s CSI program and its ability to successfully target containers to
determine if they are high risk. Specifically, staffing imbalances, combined
with a lack of minimum technical requirements for equipment used at host ports,
in addition to CBP’s use of manifest information – which can be unreliable and
incomplete – as a data source to help characterize the risk level of U.S. bound
shipments, give, according to GAO, CBP limited assurance that inspections
conducted under the program are effective.
In order to address these
program deficiencies, GAO has recommended for the C-TPAT program that CBP
eliminate the weaknesses in its validation process, hire more staff to conduct
validations, and install internal controls for the program. For the CSI
program, GAO has recommended that CBP increase staffing at CSI ports and develop
minimum technical requirements for the capabilities of inspection equipment.
When he was Commissioner of
CBP, Robert Bonner explained to Congress that CBP intends to accomplish its
“twin goals” of building more secure and more efficient borders with the C-TPAT
and CSI programs. Using words such as “dynamic” and “evolving,” he emphasized
that these programs are a work in progress, but given the global nature of the
supply chain and the difficulty of regulating overseas activity, private sector
participation in the C-TPAT and CSI programs has been critical in increasing
supply chain security because these sectors have the greatest ability to
leverage their corporate strength and demand more security enhancements from
foreign entities.
Bonner expressed confidence
in CBP’s trust and verify method and stressed that C-TPAT members are major U.S.
importers of which CBP is familiar and confident. He admitted, though, that
resource limitations have delayed progress, and that changes will be necessary.
In defense of the CSI program, Bonner responded to Congressional inquiries
regarding the quality of testing equipment in host ports by saying he has
personally seen the equipment and believes they are up to par. He reminded the
Committee that the foreign host countries pay for this equipment themselves.
But in general, Bonner made it clear the CBP will continue to work with its
partners to continue moving these programs forward.
Top
CUSTOMS AUTOMATION
FTAA
CUSTOMS AUTOMATION
Peter
Friedman, CONECT Counsel
Position:
The Coalition of New England Companies for Trade (CONECT) urges Congress to
fully fund 1) development of the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) for the
U.S. Customs Service; and 2) continuation of the Automated Commercial System
(ACS) until replaced by ACE.
Background:
Since the 1980s, the U.S. Customs Service has been moving from paper to
electronic information flows. Today, more than 90% of all import entries are
processed electronically. The Customs Automated Commercial System (ACS) handles
approximately $1 trillion in imported goods in millions of entries each year.
Unfortunately, ACS is now also operating at 90% of its capacity -- well above
its design specifications. More important, it is based on out-dated,
pre-internet technology. ACS crashed four times in late 1998, halting goods at
the border for up to six hours. The backlog of freight created by this system
breakdown took weeks to clear up.
Funding for ACE:
Customs has estimated that it will cost about $1.2 billion to build a new
Automated Commercial Environment -- ACE. Congress initially appropriated $130
million for Customs to begin development of ACE. Unfortunately, this is far less
than needed to keep the project on its 5-year timetable. We urge Congress to
increase funding for ACE development for following reasons:
-
We Can't Return to Paper.
It is unrealistic for Customs entries to be processed by paper. Yet there is
no electronic back-up system. Many experts predict that unless something is
done, ACS will experience a catastrophic failure in the near future.
-
An ACS Failure Will Hurt New England
Manufacturers and Their Workers.
In today's just-in-time world where products are manufactured using parts
and raw materials from global sources, even a brief shut down of the
nation's ports can have huge repercussions. If parts don't arrive on time to
manufacturing plants, assembly lines in the U.S. will be shut or slowed
down.
-
American Taxpayers Have a Right to an
Efficient System. U.S. importers
pay $800 million each year in merchandise processing fees to cover the cost
of collecting tariffs. These same importers also pay billions of dollars in
tariffs that go into the U.S. treasury. They have a legitimate right to
expect a system that is up-to-date.
-
A Modern System Enhances Compliance.
A modern system for transmitting import
entry information will enhance Customs' ability to track down Customs fraud
and other types of illegal activities.
Top
DOHA ROUND OF WORLD TRADE TALKS
DOHA ROUND OF WORLD TRADE
TALKS
Ray Bucheger
Office of Peter Friedman,
CONECT Counsel
It is in the best interests of the New England business community that barriers to international trade be eliminated.
As the Doha round of World Trade Organization negotiations would eliminate many
barriers to trade and thus stimulate increased imports and exports, CONECT
supports the Doha objective, and the extension of Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA) which is necessary for progress to be made on Doha.
The Doha round of
WTO negotiations began in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar. Unfortunately, little
progress has been made since the negotiations began due to
the inability of the European Union to overcome
French objections to elimination of agriculture subsidies, as well as
grandstanding by lesser developed countries who seek improved market access to
the developed economies, without apparently any willingness to improve their own
intellectual property, phytosanitary, and other requirements for joining the
global trading economy.
Many people believe
the Doha trade talks (and the rest of the President’s trade agenda for that
matter) are contingent on Congress extending TPA.
TPA would give the President and perhaps more
importantly, the other countries with which we are negotiating confidence that
the specific terms of the treaty to which they have agreed will not be
subsequently amended by Congress. Under TPA rules, Congress must simply vote to
approve or disapprove the treaty as negotiated by the President.
They argue that
there is no sense in negotiating a trade agreement this large if Congress would
simply amend it to death, which it could do absent TPA.
At the same time,
Congressional opponents of TPA say they want evidence that negotiators can make
progress in the Doha round and argue that there is no reason to extend TPA if
the round is doomed to failure.
This is an
interesting and complicated dynamic, and only became more interesting and
complicated when the Democrats took control of both Houses of Congress. While
many Democrats claim to have seized victory in their districts and states due to
their support of trade protectionism, the Chairmen of the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, the two Committees with jurisdiction
over trade matters in Congress, are supportive of the Doha round and extending
TPA (with greater protections for workers and the environment).
Whether completion
of the Doha talks depend on an extension of TPA or if an extension of TPA is
contingent on progress with the Doha talks, and regardless of the rank and file
in Congress who are opposed to free trade, CONECT urges Congress to grant the
President an extension of TPA so that the Doha negotiations can continue and the
President’s free trade agenda can move forward.
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